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On Writ of Certiorari to the 
Supreme Court of Vermont 
———— 
BRIEF OF JOHN E. CALFEE, 
ERNST R. BERNDT, ROBERT HAHN,  
TOMAS PHILIPSON, PAUL H. RUBIN, 
AND W. KIP VISCUSI AS 
AMICI CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITIONER 
———— 
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
1 
Amici  are economists and economics professors 
who teach and write on the economic impacts of 
regulation, including pharmaceutical regulation, and 
on health care policy, and who wish to ensure that 
                                                 
1 The parties have consented to the filing of this amicus brief.  
Pursuant to Rule 37.6, amici state that this brief was not 
authored in whole or in part by counsel for any party, and that 
no person or entity other than amici or their counsel made a 
monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this 
brief.  2 
the Court fully considers the adverse effects that 
might arise from the Vermont Supreme Court’s 
decision in Wyeth v. Levine, if that decision is upheld 
by the U.S. Supreme Court.  Amici have no stake   
in the outcome of this case.  They are filing this   
brief solely as individuals and not on behalf of the 
institutions with which they are affiliated. 
John E. Calfee is a Resident Scholar at the 
American Enterprise Institute.  He has written 
extensively on Food & Drug Administration (FDA) 
policy, health care policy, and the pharmaceutical 
and drug markets.  Dr. Calfee is the author of many 
publications on pharmaceutical and health care 
issues.  See, e.g., John E. Calfee, Price, Markets, and 
the Pharmaceutical Revolution (2000) and Claude 
Barfield and John E. Calfee Biotechnology and   
the Patent System: Balancing Innovation and Prop-
erty Rights (2007).  Dr. Calfee previously was a 
visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution and an 
associate professor at the Boston University School   
of Management. 
Ernst R. Berndt is the Louis B. Seley Professor of 
Applied Economics, Finance and Accounting at the 
MIT Sloan School of Management, Co-Director of the 
Biomedical Enterprise Program at Sloan School and 
the Harvard-MIT Division of Health Sciences and 
Technology, and Co-Director of the MIT Center for 
Biomedical Innovation.  He has published widely in 
health economics and pharmaceutical regulation.   
Among his publications are Opportunities for Im-
proving the Drug Development Process: Results from 
a Survey of Industry and the FDA, National Bureau 
of Economic Research working paper 11425 (with 
Adrian H. Gottschalk and Matthew W. Strobeck), and 
Cost-benefit analysis of the FDA: The case of the 3 
prescription drug user fee acts, J. Pub. Econ. v. 92, 
No. 5-6, pp. 1306-1325 (June 2008) (with Tomas 
Philipson, Adrian H.B. Gottschalk, and Eric Sun). 
Robert Hahn is executive director of the Reg-
Markets Center and a senior fellow at the American 
Enterprise Institute.  His research focuses on the 
costs and benefits of regulation.  See, e.g., Robert 
Hahn and Paul C. Tetlock, Has Economic Analysis 
Improved Regulatory Decisions?, J. Econ. Perspec-
tives, Vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 67-84 (Winter 2008).  
Tomas Philipson is a Professor at The Irving B. 
Harris Graduate School of Public Policy Studies and 
an associate member of the Department of Eco-
nomics.  He has been a visiting faculty member at 
Yale University, a visiting fellow at the World Bank, 
a Senior Economic Advisor to the head of the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA), and Senior Eco-
nomic Advisor to the head of the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services.  Philipson has pub-
lished widely on health economics and FDA regu-
lation and twice received the Kenneth Arrow Award 
of the International Health Economics Association.   
See, e.g., Cost-benefit Analysis of the FDA: The case of 
the prescription drug user fee acts, J. Pub. Econ. v. 92, 
No. 5-6, pp. 1306-1325 (June 2008) (with Ernst R. 
Berndt, Adrian H.B. Gottschalk, and Eric Sun); and 
Is the Food and Drug Administration Safe and 
Effective?, J. Econ. Perspectives, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 85-
102 (Winter 2008) (with Eric Sun). 
Paul H. Rubin is Samuel Candler Dobbs Professor 
of Economics and Law at Emory University and 
Editor in Chief of Managerial and Decision Eco-
nomics.  He has held several senior government 
positions, including Chief Economist at the U.S. 
Consumer Product Safety Commission and Assistant 4 
Director in the Bureau of Economics at the Federal 
Trade Commission.  He has published many articles 
on drug regulation and tort law and their effects.   
See, e.g.,  Matching Prescription Drugs and Con-
sumers:  The Benefits of Direct Advertising, 313 New 
Eng. J. Med. 513-515 (Aug. 22, 1985) (with Alison 
Masson). 
W. Kip Viscusi is the University Distinguished 
Professor of Law, Economics, and Management at 
Vanderbilt University.  He was previously a professor 
at Harvard Law School and the Duke University and 
Northwestern University departments of economics.  
He has written extensively on products liability, 
hazard warnings, and risk regulation generally.   
Among his publications are Reforming Products 
Liability (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1991);  Deterring Inefficient Pharmaceutical Liti-
gation: An Economic Rationale for the FDA 
Regulatory Compliance Defense, Seton Hall L. J., vol. 
24, no. 3, pp. 1437-1480 (1994) (with Steven Rowland, 
Howard Dorfman, and Charles Walsh); and Eco-
nomics of Regulation and Antitrust, 4th ed. (Cam-
bridge; MIT Press, 2005) (with Joseph Harrington 
and John Vernon). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Prominent in arguments opposing preemption of 
state tort law liability for alleged inadequacies in 
prescription drug labeling is the argument that such 
liability can complement FDA regulation by im-
proving on a regulatory scheme that fails to provide 
adequate deterrence against the marketing of unsafe 
or inadequately labeled drugs.  The premise of this 
argument is faulty.  Fundamental principles of 
economics and numerous studies of FDA drug regu-5 
lation reveal that FDA in fact errs on the side of 
overregulation of prescription drugs.  Product liabil-
ity litigation focused solely on one side of the 
prescription drug public health equation leads to 
further distortions of the drug approval and labeling 
process and exacerbates FDA’s inherent overly cau-
tious approach.  Preemption of state tort law where it 
conflicts with FDA requirements will minimize these 
distortions and thereby maximize public health.  
FDA’s incentive to overregulate is clear upon 
examination of the underlying forces that can skew 
its regulatory decisionmaking.  In particular, FDA 
faces substantial criticism when it mistakenly ap-
proves drugs that should not have been approved 
(“Type I errors”), but considerably less criticism when 
it fails to approve drugs that should have been 
approved (“Type II errors”).  As a result, FDA has an 
incentive to be overly cautious in approving new 
drugs, even though the failure to approve a beneficial 
drug can lead to more significant public health harms 
than mistaken approval of potentially dangerous 
drugs.  The same FDA tendency toward over-caution 
(Type II errors) carries over to regulation of the drug 
label, where FDA has an incentive toward over-
warning and undue contraindications.  Such exces-
sive warning language also has adverse public health 
consequences. 
State tort lawsuits exacerbate the problems of 
FDA’s overly cautious approach by imposing addi-
tional requirements on pharmaceutical companies   
to add new warnings or contraindications.  These 
requirements lead to a host of distortions in   
drug marketing and availability that have adverse 
consequences for public health and wellbeing.  Pre-
emption provides an important safeguard against 6 
expected FDA Type II errors by countering the 
exacerbating impact of state tort lawsuits for failure 
to warn.    
ARGUMENT 
  I. STATE TORT LAWSUITS EXACERBATE 
PROBLEMS CAUSED BY FOOD & DRUG 
ADMINISTRATION OVERREGULATION 
AND OVERWARNING 
  A.  Incentives Facing FDA Regulators 
Result in Excess Caution in Drug 
Approval. 
In approving the safety and efficacy, of prescription 
drugs, FDA faces the possibility of two types of error.  
First, it can approve a drug that should not have 
been approved because of safety problems.  These 
errors are called Type I errors.  Second, it can fail  
to approve a drug that should have been approved.  
These errors are called Type II errors.  Under   
well-established economic principles, the question 
whether FDA is more likely to commit Type I errors 
or Type II errors can be answered by focusing on the 
societal or institutional incentives that push FDA to 
err on one side or the other.
2  Repeated economic 
investigation of this question indicates that FDA 
incentives are skewed toward excessive caution in the 
regulation of drug development and the approval of 
new drugs, i.e., Type II errors.
3   
                                                 
2 See Henry I. Miller, First, Do No Harm, Hoover Digest, No. 
4 (2000), available at http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest 
/3493341.html. 
3  See, e.g., Sam Peltzman, Regulation of Pharmaceutical 
Innovation: The 1962 Amendments (1974)  (“These measurable 
effects [of missed benefits from slower new drug approvals, 
gains from reduced waste on ineffective drugs, and reduced 7 
This skewing can be best understood by con-
sidering the likely consequences to FDA’s image of a 
Type I versus a Type II error.  When deciding 
whether the benefits of a proposed new drug exceed 
its risks, FDA staff know that if they commit a Type I 
error—the approval of a drug that turns out to be 
insufficiently safe once marketing begins—their error 
will become known.  Because the harmful side-effects 
of the drug may be highly visible, a Type I error can 
and often does lead to impassioned criticism of the 
agency.  On the other hand, a Type II error—the 
failure to permit marketing of a drug that would in 
fact provide benefits in excess of harms—is typically 
                                                 
benefits from competition] add up to a net loss of $250 to $350 
million, or about 6 percent of total sales”); Sam Peltzman, An 
Evaluation of Consumer Protection Legislation: The 1962 Drug 
Amendments, 81 J. Pol. Econ. 1049 (1973), reprinted in Chicago 
Studies in Political Economy 303-48 (George J. Stigler ed., 
University of Chicago Press 1988) (to same effect); William M. 
Wardell & Louis Lasagna, Regulation and Drug Development 
 97  (1975) (“In examining the balance sheet for individual 
therapeutic categories (Chapter VII), it was shown that, in 
many therapeutic areas, useful and even uniquely effective or 
safe drugs have been introduced in Britain substantially earlier 
than in the United States, and at any given time the United 
States lacks a number of such drugs.”); Kenneth Kaitin & 
Jeffrey Brown, A Drug Lag Update, 29/2 Drug Info. J. 361, 372 
(1995) ( “Despite numerous regulatory reform efforts in this 
country directed toward accelerating drug development and 
review processes (described in detail in another section of this 
White Paper), the United States continues to lag behind other 
countries in the availability of important new therapeutic 
products.”); Henry I. Miller, To America’s Health: A Proposal to 
Reform the Food and Drug Administration 43 (2000) (“Type 2 
errors in the form of unreasonable governmental requirements 
and decisions can delay the marketing of a new product, lessen 
competition to produce it, and inflate its ultimate price.  They 
can even prevent marketing of a product entirely.”).   8 
known only by the relatively few persons who are 
intimately involved in developing the drug and are 
largely hidden from patients and the larger medical 
community who suffer the consequences of the error.  
Yet the adverse public health impact of a failure to 
approve a beneficial drug may be even more severe 
than the approval of an insufficiently safe drug.   
Moreover, Type I errors in approving unreasonably 
unsafe drugs are often quickly corrected precisely 
because the public learns of the error.  But the failure 
to approve a beneficial drug may go uncorrected for 
years, if at all.  As a result, the net effect of the 
asymmetry in public knowledge and publicity is to 
bias even the best-intentioned FDA regulators 
towards excessive caution and delay in approving 
new drugs.   
Recent debate over FDA’s handling of drug safety, 
notably in connection with selective serotonin reup-
take inhibitor (SSRI) antidepressants and Vioxx, an 
arthritis pain reliever, and culminating in a recent 
report from the Institute of Medicine, has made clear 
that the institutional incentives to avoid Type I 
errors at the expense of committing more Type II 
errors are very strong.  Criticism of FDA staff in 
connection with the safety of recently approved drugs 
vastly exceeds any criticism of agency sluggishness in 
approving the hundreds of drugs in development in 
recent years.  John E. Calfee, The Vioxx Fallout, AEI 
Health Policy Outlook, Sept.-Oct. 2005; Institute of 
Medicine, The Future of Drug Safety: Promoting and 
Protecting the Health of the Public  (2006); John E. 
Calfee,  Playing Catch-up: The FDA, Science, and 
Drug Regulation, AEI Health Policy Outlook, March 
2006; Peter H. Schuck, FDA Preemption of State   
Tort Law in Drug Regulation: Finding the Sweet 9 
Spot, Roger Williams U. L. Rev. (forthcoming   
2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1078013 
at 14-15. 
Notably, however, there is no evidence that FDA’s 
overly cautious approach has resulted in the approval 
of fewer unsafe drugs.  To the contrary, numerous 
studies have concluded that FDA’s many years of 
administrative delay in approving new drugs has 
caused reductions in the benefits to be gained from 
new drug development while contributing few, if any, 
tangible reductions in drug-related public health 
risks.  For example, comparisons of drug approval 
regimes in the United States, Spain and the U.K. 
demonstrate that the more rapid drug approval 
timelines in the European countries have not led to 
an increased rate of subsequent drug safety with-
drawals in those countries, as would be expected if 
FDA’s cautious approach prevented the approval of 
unsafe drugs.  Olav M. Bakke, et al., Drug Safety 
Discontinuations in the United Kingdom, the United 
States, and Spain from 1974 through 1993: A 
Regulatory Perspective, Clinical Pharmacology and 
Therapeutics vol. 58, p. 108 (1995) (noting post-
approval drug withdrawals of, respectively, 3% in 
U.S. and Spain and 4% in U.K.).  Likewise, various 
researchers—including the Institute of Medicine—
have examined drug safety before and after the 
enactment in the United States of the Prescription 
Drug User Fee Act of 1992 and found that the 
procedures in the Act allowing faster new drug 
approvals have not resulted in any diminution of 
drug safety.  See Institute of Medicine, The Future of 
Drug Safety: Promoting and Protecting the Health of 
the Public 3: 5-8 (2006) (reviewing the effects of the 
Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992).  And a 
recent econometric study found that the faster drug 10 
approval times secured under the Act have demon-
strably improved consumer welfare.  See Tomas 
Philipson et al., Cost-benefit Analysis of the FDA: The 
case of the prescription drug user fee acts, J. Pub. 
Econ. v. 92, No. 5-6, pp. 1306-1325 (June 2008); 
Tomas Philipson & Eric Sun, Is the Food and Drug 
Administration Safe and Effective?, J. Econ. Perspec-
tives, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 85-102 (Winter 2008). 
  B. The Same Perverse Incentives Result 
in Excess Caution by FDA in Drug 
Labeling. 
When FDA approves a new drug, it also approves a 
detailed label to accompany the drug.  The label 
contains indications (conditions to be treated), dos-
age, administration, and other details including 
warnings and contraindications, along with sum-
maries of clinical trials and other data.  These labels 
are designed for use by learned intermediary phy-
sicians (without whom prescription drugs may not be 
obtained), although others, including patients, may 
also make use of labels.  As new information arrives 
about the risks and benefits of approved drugs, FDA 
continues to review the drug labels and effects 
labeling changes as appropriate.  FDA employs spe-
cialized experts in the field to conduct this ongoing 
review and gathers voluminous post-marketing 
information from pharmaceutical firms, medical care 
providers, and other sources.  See, e.g., Should FDA 
Drug and Medical Device Regulation Bar State 
Liability Claims?:  Hearing Before the H. Comm. on 
Oversight & Gov’t Reform (testimony of Randall 
Lutter, FDA Deputy Commissioner for Policy) (May 
14, 2008) (“Lutter Testimony”). 11 
FDA has long recognized that labels must give 
varying degrees of emphasis to specific items of 
information, and that labels should not contain all 
information of possible interest. See  Final Rule, 
Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for 
Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 
71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3968 (Jan. 24, 2006).  FDA has for 
many years sought to modify and improve drug labels 
while avoiding the constant danger of overwarning. 
Id.; Lutter Testimony.  If all potentially negative 
information were to be included, such as every known 
possible side-effect, two adverse consequences would 
follow.  One is overwarning: the presence on labels of 
unfounded or disproportionately prominent warning 
information, which could deter or discourage drug 
use that would be beneficial after taking reasonable 
account of risks and benefits.  The second is “clutter”: 
the presence of so much information that physicians 
would find it hard to distinguish important informa-
tion from relatively unimportant information and 
might not even bother to peruse all the information.  
71 Fed. Reg. at 3935, 3968.  
FDA’s decisions about drug labels are strongly 
affected by the incentives faced by FDA staff.  We 
have described how those incentives cause FDA to 
exercise excessive caution when approving new 
drugs.  Similar reasoning applies to FDA decision-
making about what risk and benefit information to 
require in drug labels.  See  W. Kip Viscusi, et al., 
Deterring Inefficient Pharmaceutical Litigation: An 
Economic Rationale for the FDA Regulatory Compli-
ance Defense, Seton Hall L.J., vol. 24, pp. 1437, 1469 
n.118 (1994). When deciding about the contents of 
new drug labels and changes in labels for approved 
drugs, FDA is once again faced with the possibility of 
both Type I and Type II errors, i.e., providing 12 
inadequate warnings or requiring warning language 
and contraindications that overstate risk and dis-
courage beneficial use.  And once again, the incen-
tives facing FDA in making that decision cause FDA 
to err on the side of being overly cautious.  In 
deciding not to require a specific warning, for 
example, the FDA staff faces the prospect of vigorous, 
public criticism if patients are harmed by the drug, 
even if the more aggressive warning was not 
scientifically warranted or would have lead to 
disincentives in drug usage that outweighed any 
potential reduction in risks.  Far less criticism is 
likely to occur if the label warns too strongly about 
harms that in fact almost never occur, or if the label 
contraindicates certain uses that are likely to be 
more beneficial than harmful for patients.  Patients 
would probably not know that they had foregone 
treatments that in fact would have been worth the 
true risks, and the victims of this FDA error 
accordingly will never call FDA to task.  On the 
whole, the agency is likely to be far more risk averse 
than is justified by the actual balance of risks and 




                                                 
4 For example, the label for Rotateq, the rotavirus vaccine, 
was recently amended to include a warning against intestinal 
blockage, a rare but genuine problem with an earlier rotavirus 
vaccine that was removed from the market.  FDA took this 
action even though extremely large clinical trials involving tens 
of thousands of subjects had revealed no excess likelihood of 
blockage for Rotateq compared to a placebo.  Label on Merck 
Vaccine to Disclose a Death, Wall St. J., May 2, 2008, at B8. 13 
  C. State Tort Product Liability Lawsuits 
Exacerbate the Problems of FDA’s 
Excess Caution. 
While advocates of state tort law prescription drug 
litigation often argue that litigation requirements 
complement FDA requirements by countering the 
risk of FDA underwarning or underregulation, the 
economic analysis of FDA incentives in the drug and 
drug labeling approval process demonstrates that 
FDA is far more likely to err in the other direction.  
Accordingly, rather than creating requirements that 
cure FDA Type I errors, state tort law creates 
requirements that exacerbate FDA Type II errors   
by causing pharmaceutical manufacturers to hold 
back on seeking approval of new drugs or to add   
defensive labeling, including further undue contra-
indications or overwarnings that further squeeze out 
physician understanding of more significant labeled 
information.  
In state tort lawsuits, juries necessarily focus on a 
highly specific personal tragedy rather than on 
societal trade-offs, giving more weight to the harm 
allegedly suffered by the plaintiff than to the benefits 
realized by past and future non-injured users of the 
drug, because benefited patients will play no role in 
the trial.  Given the one-sided nature of their inquiry, 
there is little reason to expect the lay jurors’ labeling 
decisions to be superior to those of FDA in terms   
of balancing the risks and benefits of additional 
contraindications and warnings on the drug label.   
See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1008 
(2008).  Rather, the jury balance will be skewed in 
favor of more warnings.  Of course, juries will not 
always decide for the plaintiff.  But when they do, 
there is an excellent chance that the verdict will fault 14 
the manufacturer for failing to provide an over-
warning or unwarranted contraindication or warning 
language that would have unduly cluttered the drug 
label, given that the label already reflects FDA’s 
excess caution. 
The impact of this added layer of tort liability 
overdeterrence leads to numerous adverse conse-
quences that are contrary to public wellbeing, such 
as: 
1.  Limiting drug availability:  Because prescrip-
tion drug product liability lawsuits often involve 
allegations of substantial harm, plaintiff verdicts not 
uncommonly involve sizable awards for pain and 
suffering damages, punitive damages, or both.   
Experience has shown that pharmaceutical firms 
often treat a large damages verdict as a predictor of 
more such verdicts to come.  See Paul H. Rubin, John 
E. Calfee, and Mark F. Grady BMW vs Gore:  
Mitigating the Punitive Economics of Punitive Dam-
ages, Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev., vol. 5, pp. 179-216 (1997).  
While estimates of the cost of liability for pharma-
ceuticals are few, liability costs are not trivial.  For 
example, a report prepared by the Council of 
Economic Advisors found that in 2000, liability costs 
across all U.S. industries were $180 billion, or 
roughly 1.8 percent of GDP.
5  In the area of drugs and 
medical devices, Richard Manning identified liability 
costs for the diphtheria-pertussis-tetanus vaccine by 
comparing changes in the price of the diphtheria-
tetanus vaccine, estimating that at their peak, 
expected liability costs accounted for roughly 90 
                                                 
5 Council of Economic Advisors, Who Pays for Tort Liability 
Claims?  An Economic Analysis of the U.S. Tort Liability System 
(2002). 15 
percent of the vaccine’s price.
6  In related work, 
Manning found that differences in product liability 
regimes can explain much of the difference in 
Canadian and U.S. prices on drugs.
7 
The expected costs of product liability litigation   
are added to a firm’s cost-benefit analysis in the 
marketing of drug products and can lead to the 
unavailability of drug products, both because some 
patients may no longer be able to afford treatment 
and because the expected litigation costs may drive 
products off the market entirely.  For example, 
childhood vaccine manufacturers quickly raised prices 
and in many cases exited the market in the wake of a 
few adverse verdicts in the 1980s.  See  Richard L. 
Manning,  Changing Rules in Tort Law and the 
Market for Childhood Vaccines, J.L. & Econ., vol. 37, 
no. 1, pp. 247-286 (1994).  The anti-nausea drug 
Bendectin was withdrawn from the market in 1983 
after a small number of adverse verdicts (which were 
subsequently reversed), despite FDA insistence that 
the drug did not cause the birth defects that gave rise 
to litigation.  See Paul H. Rubin, John E. Calfee, and 
Mark F. Grady, BMW vs Gore:  Mitigating the Puni-
tive Economics of Punitive Damages, Sup. Ct. Econ. 
Rev. vol. 5, pp. 179, 194 (1997); see also American 
Medical Association, Report of the Board of Trustees, 
Impact Of Product Liability On The Development Of 
New Medical Technologies 1, 79 (1988) (“AMA Board 
Report”) (“Certain older technologies have been re-
moved from the market, not because of sound 
scientific evidence indicating lack of safety or efficacy 
                                                 
6 Richard M. Manning, Changing Rules in Tort Law and the 
Market for Childhood Vaccines, vol. 37, no. 1, J.L. & Econ. 247-
75 (1994). 
7 Id. 16 
but because product liability suits have exposed 
manufacturers to unacceptable financial risks.”). 
2.  Disincentives for Research & Development:  
The costs imposed by product liability litigation have 
an impact not only on the availability of drugs 
already on the market but on the pipeline for new 
drugs, because pharmaceutical companies necessarily 
factor these costs into decisions whether to incur the 
significant expense required to research and develop 
drug products and bring them to the market.  Where 
the level of risk is high, the risk of state tort law 
liability is inversely related to investment in research 
and development activity.
8  Firms invest less in drugs 
that promise to provide substantial clinical benefits 
but also have significant side-effects (such as many 
drugs for cancer and multiple sclerosis).  Thus, 
particularly to the extent companies are faced with 
state tort liability risks that are largely divorced from 
the FDA balancing of risks and benefits in drug and 
drug labeling approval, the financial payoff from 
researching these drugs and bringing them to market 
is reduced, causing fewer such drugs to be made 
available to patients.  See Louis Lasagna, The Chill-
ing Effect of Product Liability Development, in The 
Liability Maze:  The Impact of Liability Law on 
Safety and Innovation 334, 335-37 (Peter W. Huber & 
Robert E. Litan eds., 1991); National Research 
Council & Institute of Medicine, Developing New 
Contraceptives 141 (1990) (unpredictable nature of 
litigation is a significant disincentive for fertility 
research and development); AMA Board Report at 79 
(“Innovative new products are not being developed or 
                                                 
8 Michael J. Moore & W. Kip Viscusi, Product Liability Enter-
ing the Twenty-first Century: The U.S. Perspective 25, 27 (2001).    17 
are being withheld from the market because of 
liability concerns.”). 
3.  Loss of FDA control over drug labeling:  Even 
a single costly loss in a state tort lawsuit alleging 
failure to warn imposes a legal standard that 
effectively requires a manufacturer to make changes 
in its labeling to avoid anticipated costs of future 
litigation.  Although it theoretically might be possible 
to change labels only for drugs sold in the state in 
which the lawsuit was brought (assuming such a 
state-by-state approach was legal), this seems 
unlikely.  Paul H. Rubin, John E. Calfee, and Mark 
F. Grady BMW vs Gore:  Mitigating the Punitive 
Economics of Punitive Damages, Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev., 
vol. 5, pp. 179-216 (1997).  For drugs used in doctors’ 
offices, a state-by-state labeling arrangement would 
require considerable control over the actions of 
wholesalers, who are normally free to resell their 
supply more or less where they please.  It would also 
be hard to prevent patients from using the drug in 
another state after purchase.  Finally, advertising 
and marketing, which involve risk communication, 
would become far more complex.  Thus it seems likely 
that the label would be changed nationwide, not just 
in the state in which the adverse verdict occurred.  As 
a result, a single state tort judgment could effectively 
wrest control of nationwide drug labeling require-
ments from FDA, thus depriving the medical commu-
nity in all states of the benefits of FDA expert deter-
minations on proper and balanced drug warnings. 
4.  Defensive labeling:  Firms that suffer adverse 
verdicts would reasonably attempt to predict other 
warnings which, if added to the label, might prevent 
costly litigation in the future.  Their competitors, who 
can be expected to pay close attention to litigation 18 
and its outcomes, would perform similar analyses on 
their own drugs.  With no way to know exactly what 
would be required through future litigation, firms are 
likely to add new warning language and contra-
indications and create overly crowded labels that 
seek to anticipate a wide variety of potential plaintiff 
allegations.  See  Wesley A. Magat and W. Kip 
Viscusi,  Informational Approaches to Regulation  
1-17, 87-105 (MIT Press 1992) (discussing research 
showing that substantial increases in the amount of 
information included on a label decreases the 
performance of the hazard warning by causing 
information overload); see also W. Kip Viscusi, 
Reforming Products Liability 151 (1991); Aaron D. 
Twerski et al., The Use and Abuse of Warnings in 
Products Liability – Design Defect Litigation Comes of 
Age, 61 Cornell L. Rev. 495, 514 (1976).  Much of   
this new warning information would have greater 
prominence than would be justified by the balance of 
risks and benefits (precisely because FDA declined   
to require such information notwithstanding its 
tendency toward excessive caution).  The effect would 
be to discourage beneficial use of drugs whose labels 
contain these litigation-induced contraindications 
and warnings. 
As the FDA and others have long recognized, faced 
with state tort liability regardless of FDA approval of 
specific warning language, manufacturers may seek 
to supply warnings about virtually all possible harms 
that might form the basis for a lawsuit. 71 Fed. Reg. 
at 3935.  For example, a series of Wall Street Journal 
articles published in 2005 noted that the three 
erectile dysfunction drugs on the market each carried 
labels more than 20 pages long.  Scott Hensley, Long 
Labels Help Drug Firms, But Can Obscure What 
Matter, Wall St. J., June 28, 2005; Scott Hensley, 19 
Liability Worries Cloud Drug Labels:  In Bloated 
Package Inserts; Fine Print Can Overshadow Facts of 
Most Use to Doctors, Wall St. J., July 5, 2005.  This 
litigation-defensive manufacturer tendency to clutter 
labels with risk information exacerbates FDA’s 
tendency toward excess caution in drug labeling.   
5. Problems exacerbated further in state tort cases 
alleging missing contraindications:  The concerns 
discussed above based upon state tort law require-
ments for added warnings take on particular promi-
nence where, as in this case, a plaintiff is arguing 
that a drug should have contained a contraindication 
not required by FDA.  Normally, the risk-benefit 
balancing process for prescription drugs operates at 
two points:  first, when FDA decides what warnings 
to include on the label and how those warnings are 
organized, and second, when physicians take account 
of label warnings as they decide what drugs to 
prescribe.  If failure-to-warn lawsuits cause un-
founded or excessive warnings to be placed on the 
label, physicians can still exercise their usual role in 
balancing risks and benefits, albeit with less accurate 
information than would otherwise be available.   
Contraindications work differently.  Physicians are 
likely to view contraindications as outright bans, 
because to prescribe in the face of a labeled con-
traindication is to court a malpractice lawsuit and 
punitive damages if anything goes wrong.  Contra-
indications therefore largely replace, rather than 
supplement, the usual balancing of risks and 
benefits.   
Again, there is no reason to expect juries in tort 
liability trials to perform a better balancing act than 
FDA.  Juries will tend to impose new contrain-
dications, which would prevent physicians from 20 
taking due account of comparative risks and benefits 
in the highly fact-specific situations in which 
physicians often making prescribing decisions.  As 
the dynamics of litigation play out, the problem will 
probably become worse.  A contraindication imposed 
by a jury in one state will likely be translated by 
pharmaceutical firms into a nationwide contrain-
dication because of the practical inability to limit 
litigation exposure by single-state label changes.  If 
juries in certain states or regions are especially 
inclined to find fault with drug labels and impose 
contraindications, physicians in other states will 
likely face the same contraindications as label 
changes are implemented nationwide.  Then patients 
who would have benefited from the contraindicated 
use will be denied those benefits even if the expected 
benefit greatly exceeds the likelihood of harm.  In 
extreme cases, manufacturers may choose to remove 
useful drugs from the market, as happened with 
many childhood vaccines in the 1980s. 
CONCLUSION 
The question whether state tort litigation can 
complement public safety by imposing requirements 
in excess of those imposed by FDA necessarily 
depends in part on whether FDA regulation itself is 
insufficiently or overly cautious.  Because FDA is 
faced with incentives that lead it to stake out overly 
cautious positions on drug approval and drug 
labeling, state tort litigation imposing additional 
requirements leads to a further departure away from 
the most socially beneficial outcome. 
Given this background, it is clear that the public 
health would only be improved if state tort lawsuits 
like the one below were held preempted.  For the 21 
reasons set forth above, the economist Amici, Messrs. 
Calfee, Berndt, Hahn, Philipson, Rubin, and Viscusi, 
respectfully submit that the decision of the Supreme 
Court of Vermont should be reversed. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
THEODORE H. FRANK 
1150 Seventeenth Street, NW
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